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Abstract. The use of personal data has incredible potential to beneﬁt both society
and individuals through increased understanding of behaviour, communication and
support for emerging forms of socialisation and connectedness. However, there are
risks associated with disclosing personal information, and present systems show a
systematic asymmetry between the subjects of the data and those who control and
manage the way that data is propagated and used. This leads to a tension between a
desire to engage with online society and enjoy its beneﬁts on one hand, and a distrust
of those with whom the data is shared on the other. In this chapter, we explore a
set of obfuscation techniques which may help to redress the balance of power when
sharing personal data, and return agency and choice to users of online services.
Keywords. obfuscation, data politics, personal data stores, social sachines
Introduction
In 1890, Warren and Brandeis called for consideration of new laws to better secure the
‘the right to be let alone’, as ‘the private lives, habits, acts and relations of individuals’
were perceived to be under threat by the emerging technologies of their time – including
‘instant’ photography, and early electro-mechanical recordingdevices [47].Over a century
and a quarter later, technology still continues to threaten individuals’ right to be left alone,
now at unprecedented scale and ﬁdelity. In terms of technological sophistication, the
massive computational capacity hosted in various data warehouses is being used to track
individuals’ daily activities, communications and locations. Such proﬁling comprises a
race to build the most complete picture(s) of each person’s life, so as to be able to apply
this in-depth knowledge to precisely target them with, advertising and other behavioural
manipulations – often in ways too subtle to be perceived (e.g. [28]).
Such behavioural manipulation, driven by omnipresent observation, brings to mind
Bentham’s thought experiment of the Panopticon, developed by Foucault, describing a
prison in which inmates’ lives are constantly surveilled as a means of discipline and
1Dave Murray-Rust, Centre for Intelligent Systems and Applications, Department of Informatics, University
of Edinburgh.
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exertion of control. In the world of technologically-driven data collection which we in-
habit, this has effects both on people’s behaviour, as they internalise the fact that they are
surveilled, and on the way in which they are treated, and socially sorted by the gears of
our algorithmic society [42].
Meanwhile, the rise of tracking has not been met with a corresponding increase in
either public awareness of how and when observation is taking place, nor practical ways
with which individuals can protect themselves from unwanted proﬁling and targeting. As
a result, a great asymmetry has arisen between the information brokers with vast resources
that track, and those end-user citizens who are being tracked with little or no choice.
As if this asymmetry was not problematic enough, the few privacy-enhancing tools that
have proven effective against surveillance have often been portrayed by mainstream news
and media outlets as tools for terrorst and paedophiles further discouraging their use and
adoption in the mainstream (e.g. [1,27]).
In this chapter, we are interested in practices which can cloud the lenses of the
observers, to return to people the choice of how they are seen, and to help regain some
control of the manner in which our lives are surveilled, both socially and otherwise.
We discuss and analyse methods of privacy protection that advance beyond the current
state of anonymisation tools which obscure the tracks of individuals, towards those that
employmethods borrowed from informationwarfare [19,33], in order to allow individuals
to regain autonomy from unsolicited tracking and behavioural control. We ﬁrst discuss
the rise of personal data economy, followed by a survey of lying and falsiﬁcation in
context-aware systems, current anonymisation and privacy tools. This is followed by an
overview of strategies for obfuscation, some of which are currently implemented in either
mainstream tools or proof of concept studies, and some of which are speculative, future
possibilities.
1. Background
1.1. The Rise of Personal Data and Services Reliant on it
As we pass through the digitally-augmented world that we collectively inhabit, the set of
actions with the potential to produce data grows year on year. Portions of this outpouring
are kept and stored as capta, from capere: to keep [16]. From using an access card
to unlock a door, right down to tracking individual footfalls, pervasive digital systems
illuminate and annotate our physical activity. Accreting around this body of physical
observation is an expanding sphere of mental observation and analysis. This can take the
form of active practises around recording mental states, such as journalling, but it can also
include computational inference, where frequency of posting on social networks becomes
an adjunct metric for connectedness, and search terms indicators of intent. As such, the
modes of collecting this information can range from explicit, user initiated submission
of data, through consensual background recording, to invisible, asymmetric electronic
surveillance.
Increasingly, in order to utilise services, we must provide our data to third parties.
This ranges from mobile phone numbers being required for Yahoo accounts, to location
data being shared with Foursquare or Grindr, to the NHS adding personal health informa-
tion to centralised databases. The pervasiveness of computationally mediated action and
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interaction inmodern lifemeans that formuch of this data ‘refusal is not a practical option,
as data collection is an inherent condition of many essential societal transactions’ [10].
This leads us to introduce the term ﬁat data—when an organisation uses its position
to demand (by ﬁat) the disclosure of certain information in return for use of its services.
Much as being a citizen of the United Kingdom requires paying taxes in pounds Sterling,
if one wants to interact socially on Facebook, one must pay the personal data tax which
they demand.
In some cases, the provision of personal data is a necessary requirement for the
provision of a service, but in others it represents an attempt by the organisation to create
a monetisable product from its users. Many pieces of data ﬁt both goals – for example
the addition of mobile phone numbers to user accounts may have security beneﬁts for the
users, but it also adds stronger, more persistent ties to ofﬂine identities.
When data is collected, there is a spectrum of approaches from outright demands,
to asking or encouraging users to furnish their data. Increasingly, gamiﬁcation is used to
manipulate users into self-surveillance, by providing rewards – whether within the system
or through the promise of self-improvement – for activities which require the sharing of
data to function:
Literally, within an hour of waking up, I am playing at least two games that promise
to help me become a more productive worker and proliﬁc writer. . . . I want to suggest
two things: 1) that gamiﬁcation is a form of surveillance; and 2) this surveillance is
pleasurable [48].
Fitness apps, activity monitors, location based social networks require the user to hand
over their location data in return for the promise of increased ﬁtness, self awareness to
the ability to connect with others. This user-driven data collection becomes a form of
participatory surveillance:
Online social networking can also be empowering for the user, as the monitoring
and registration facilitates new ways of constructing identity, meeting friends and
colleagues as well as socializing with strangers. This changes the role of the user from
passive to active, since surveillance in this context offers opportunities to take action,
seek information and communicate [2].
There have been calls to create privacy enhancing tools which minimise the amount
of data that is collected to only that which is necessary. Data minimisation, combined
with user control over the data and preservation of the context where the personal data
was originally disclosed, make up the Privacy 3.0 view of Borcea-Pﬁtzmann et al. [7]. As
the ability of technology to record our lives evolves and improves, there is an increasingly
acute need that the legislative side must catch up and provide the framework for the
recognition of personal information ownership rights [41].
There is a divergence between the goals of privacy conscious users and organisa-
tions providing services based on personal information. Spiekermann and Novotny have
developed a tiered model for privacy-aware information markets to elucidate the tension
between these different actors [43]. The model divides the market into four spaces: cus-
tomer relationships, organisational control, customer control, and safe harbours for big
data. Each of these spaces has its own rules and responsibilities for those operating within
it, and recommendations from the authors on what technical and legislative infrastruc-
ture is needed for their realisation. Some of the most important issues and solutions they
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present include the separation of the service exchange from the information exchange,
the mandatory privacy-friendly service option that providers must offer, and the lawful
accountability of organisations for the personal information that they collect, including
any subcontractors they might pass the information to.
In summary, while there are many situations where we are coerced, cajoled or ma-
nipulated into sharing our personal data, the cost of avoiding such sharing is increasingly
becoming untenable for large sections of the population of the connected world. How-
ever, there are steps being taken in the direction of a privacy-aware market for personal
information which protect the ownership rights of users over their personal data, and their
right to privacy, while also allowing for the market to innovate and grow based on legally
obtained and used, and of higher quality personal information.
1.2. Issues with Data Sharing, Control and the Future
Sharing data, by deﬁnition, is the entrusting of other parties with information; this nec-
essarily involves relinquishing control over how it is subsequently handled and dissemi-
nated.While it is possible to attach terms and conditions to the data at the point of sharing,
the sharer must rely either on the technological means or the compliance of the recipients.
Technological means to control information usage – such as Digital Rights2 Management
(DRM) – are generally quickly circumvented [15, p. 6]. Research is being carried out
into improving accountability (e.g. [18]), which can help to create a context which limits
breaches of trust. However, this again relies on mechanisms outside the control of the
sharer, who must rely on legal means and the evolution of social norms to ensure their
desires are met. Essentially, once data is shared the sharer has no control over what hap-
pens to it. Once shared, the data becomes persistent. Bruce Schneier commented3 that we
are in the middle of a social change, where the ephemerality of action is being lost:
Google doesn’t only know what I think better than my wife does, it knows what I
think better than I do, because it remembers all I said and did.
We are used to operating in a world where what we say will be forgotten sooner or later,
where actions remain embedded in the context in which they occurred. The increasing
persistence of record challenges this, as all utterances and behaviour becomes permanently
availble for later scrutiny.
There are many issues with sharing data; we highlight four of them here
Sharing is persistent, while situations evolve; once data is shared, there is no technical
means to revoke it. However, the context around its sharing and the organisations
involved are subject to change. For instance:
• a government or other organisation may decide to share previously conﬁdential
data, as in the case of the recent care.data ﬁasco in the UK
• a company may be bought and its assets acquired – the purchase of Moves
by Facebook and the potential for subsumption of location tracking into social
network data raised issues around the terms and conditions of data handling
companies
2Often called Digital Restrictions management by opponents, e.g. www.defectivebydesign.org
3As part of a panel at the “Don’t Spy on Us” day in London, UK, on 7 June 2014.
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• unseen events such as security breaches can expose vast swathes of personal
data, or court proceedings may force private communications to become public
– the Enron emails still represent the largest publicly available corpus of private
emails.
Technology improves: what is safe to share nowmaynot be in the future.BradTempleton
from theElectronic FreedomFoundation uses the analogy of ‘Time travelling robots
from the future’: the information collected now will be subjected to increasingly
sophisticated analysis techniques as time progresses, so the implications of sharing
that information can be far beyond expectations. For example, in the future, it may
be possible to carry out facial recognition on massive quantities of CCTV footage,
and reconstruct the movements of a large number of citizens. This corresponds to
the surveillance robots coming back in time and monitoring us now. In a similar
vein: ‘Would you have liked to be gay 40 years ago in a monitored society? Or an
enemy of J. Edgar Hoover withmodern tools in his hands?’ [44]. Sharing data today
cedes control to the entities of tomorrow, with their greatly enhanced capabilities.
De-identiﬁcation is not a magic bullet: data is often shared subject to the condition that
it will only be shared in an anonymised or de-identiﬁed form. Whilst sharing de-
identiﬁed data aids in privacy preservation, it can also create a false sense of se-
curity, since it is generally impossible to rule out the chance of re-identiﬁcation.
This might be through the set of data released, or through the fusion of multiple
data sources to provide higher discriminatory power. As a highly public example:
Netﬂix challenged the public to create a better recommendation engine, based on
a corpus of anonymised viewing histories. Subsequently, it was shown that many
records within the database could be identiﬁed by comparison with publicly avail-
able sources [37], let alone access to other, non-public data. Narayanan and Felten’s
recent report [36] explains in a non-technical manner why de-identiﬁcation of data
remains problematic. Some data is particularly resistant to de-identiﬁcation: for
example, location data, where four data points are enough for re-identiﬁcation in
many cases [13].
Databases can be joined: as more databases of personal information become available,
whether publicly or privately, the possibility tomatch, join, correlate, and share data
increases, and the effects of single points expand well beyond the environment in
which they were created or shared. In short, data are held in leaky containers: ‘data
move freely between different sectors of society with the result that information
from discrete contexts, e.g. private life, work life and shopping, are being mixed
rather than contained separately.’ [32, p. 37–44]. This leads to unexpected and
unforseeable consequences when sharing seemingly innocuous data points: we are
not in a position to know the outcomes of our actions.
1.3. The Beneﬁcial Uses of Ambiguity and Lies in Social Mediation
Studies in Computer Mediated Communication (CMC) and agent-based modelling of
online communities have studied the use of deception both in real and simulated settings,
revealing a contrast between pro-social forms of lying and deception, and anti-social
forms [25]. A wide range of pro-social kinds of deception have been documented, pri-
marily around coping strategies that people adopt towards dealing with the demands and
complexities of social mediation in increasingly digitally-connected lives.
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One strand of work pertaining to such coping strategies, is the exploration of how
people leverage the ‘space of ambiguity’ created by ‘low-bandwidth’ computer-mediated
communications channels, such as SMS (text messaging) or Instant Messaging, or even
voice mobile phone conversations. Here, ambiguity about the channel is used to facilitate
the use of pro-social deception for the purpose of efﬁcient mediation. For instance, an
individual might intentionally ignore an incoming call, or blame poor reception (where
there is none) to terminate a call prematurely in a situation where they are with other
priorities, or wish to avoid talking to someone for another reason. In work by Aoki and
Woodruff [4], it is argued that such uses of ambiguity are beneﬁcial to the actors who use
them, providing effective avenues for exercising control while simultaneously mitigating
potentially socially awkward or damaging situations, with a low social risk. As digital
systems become increasingly sensor-enabled and aware of people’s activities in the drive
to provide more ‘real-life’ kinds of interpersonal interaction, the space for ambiguity
collapses. This reduces people’s ability to leverage ambiguity, potentially reducing in-
dividual autonomy. Aoki and Woodruff argue that it is essential for designers to design
communications systems with some ambiguity left, so that users retain ﬂexibility around
coping strategies for social mediation.
The second strand pertains to the use of ‘butler lies’, which are a more explicit
use of deception. Butler lies are used for the purposes of simplifying social channel
mediation. For example, in order to terminate a conversation without leaving the other
party feeling unimportant, one might use the excuse: ‘I have a meeting with my boss’,
when in fact, no such meeting exists [21]. Reynolds et al. found that butler lies amounted
to 27.1% of all communications mediation messages sent by participants who texted
partners and co-workers [39]. The purpose of such messages was often to mitigate social
awkwardness or reputational damage, and reduce attentional load. Additionally, theywere
used independently of the nature of the relationship among communicating parties. Such
lies were particularly employed in awkward situations, such as when a speaker wishes to
convey the that they are ‘too busy to interact with the recipient, but not too busy to interact
with others’ [39]. A detailed analysis of the effects of having the lies exposed showed
that the potential emotional impacts were overall small, and much less signiﬁcant than
for other kinds of lies.
The important role of these studies is to demonstrate the beneﬁcial nature of some
forms of deception and witholding of information as coping strategies to deal with the
complexities of social coordination and an increasing demand for communication. The
goals of translucence in communication systems [17] are noble, but theymust be balanced
against users needs for ambiguity and autonomy.
While lie maintenance required to avoid discovery may be trivial (‘sorry, I’m hungry,
have to go!’), it becomes complicated as lies extend over time, loose their ephemerality,
and become woven into the social fabric. The ability to compare multiple accounts of
history – especially once the time travelling robots are involved – means that dissonance
within the social fabric is more obvious than weaknesses in a single thread.
1.4. Managing Multiple Identities
A natural part of online life is the ability to tailor the persona we present to different com-
munities and contexts. An individual may want to disclose certain things to their profes-
sional colleagues, while presenting differently to friends and family or non-mainstream
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friend groups. As an example, proliﬁc content creators on Youtube have multiple online
personae for different kinds of content—‘ofﬁcial’ channels, a personal one, and sometimes
channels for the works of particular characters [20].
Pseudonyms are one way of representing personae. In [12] Dalton describes
pseudonymity in social machines as a one-to-one or a one-to-many relationship – between
the human and the pseudonyms. It is possible for a person to be consistently known by
a pseudonym over several systems, or use many pseudonyms because they are easy to
create and to maintain. However, the many-to-one relation is possible as well, as illus-
trated by Anonymous, or by Nicholas Bourbaki in the ﬁeld of mathematics, where the
same pseudonym is used by a group. The group can evolve in time while the pseudonym
remains.
Social networks are prone to ‘context collapse’ [8,34] where the personae are forcibly
merged. The spreading and linking of data across multiple sources – leaky containers
– contributes to this contextual collapse. In particular, data which is rooted in physical
fact provides multiple opportunities for joining up otherwise separate databases. These
data leakages affect users in a manner which is at once invisible and corrosive to the
construction and maintenance of personae.
1.5. Veriﬁcation and Provenance as an Alternative to Sharing
Sharing is a crude mechanism. Once data has been shared the originator can no longer
exert control over it and must rely on the behaviour of the recipient, which, as noted, may
fail to meet user expectations. As danah boyd notes: ‘Anymodel of privacy that focuses on
the control of information will fail’. This leads the teenagers that boyd studies to engage
in social steganography, manipulating messages so that ‘Only those who are in the know
have the necessary information to look for and interpret the information provided.’ [9].
Strategies like thisworkwhen there is a difference in understanding between the surveilled
and the surveiller, and collapse as soon as the comprehension barrier is removed.
Validation, however, is a more subtle tool: if a user’s personal dataset can be made
sufﬁciently questionable as to be useless on its own, then locus of control shifts to the
user choosing to validate parts of the dataset which can be performed in a more nuanced,
contextualised manner. If a user is the ﬁnal arbiter of trust, they can decide to i) sign
parts of their record, so that it is veriﬁed public fact; ii) co-sign it with another entity,
so either can also verify it but not anyone else; iii) verify it through an anonymous
channel, so that the entity to whom they provide veriﬁcation cannot propagate the claim
further. This veriﬁcation can be carried out entirely separately from the data store itself,
allowing for the presentation of different datasets as valid in different contexts, as well
as unorthodox methods such as using the Bitcoin blockchain to notarise datasets, so that
they can be veriﬁed in the future without revealing them as true at the time. A conceptual
move towards veriﬁcation and provenance-based approaches underpins the obfuscation
strategies outlined in the rest of this chapter.
2. Review of Current Approaches and Tools
Privacy tools for end users of the Web have focused on approaches to allow people to
cloak their originating location (IP address) and identity online, as they access web sites
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that may be instrumented with code from any number of advertising networks and tracker
agents. The most basic of such tools constitute simple browser add-ons that explicitly
block the execution and downloading of web beacons, tracking pixels and other tracking
agents, through use of a dictionary-approach (of known tracking agents) (e.g. Discon-
nectMe4 or AdBlock Plus5), or using adaptive algorithms to infer cross-site tracking (e.g.
Privacy Badger6). Similarly, plugins such as HTTPSEverywhere7 force the browser to
communicate with all web sites using encrypted HTTP, to prevent ISPs and other interme-
diaries from eavesdropping on trafﬁc between the end user’s computer and the end-user
host. The use of HTTPS also thwarts some deep-packet inspection (DPI) based tracking
methods [29] – such as those employed by public WiFi access points at international
Starbucks coffee shops, which are used to determine customers’ interests and also to ﬁlter
and re-rank search results to beneﬁt Starbucks.
In the middle have been a handful of application- or service- speciﬁc anti-tracking
tools, including TrackMeNot [24], a plugin which aims to reduce tracking and personali-
sation done by search-engines by diluting the user’s query within a ﬂood of other, random
search queries. Similarly, CacheCloak [35], intercepts requests for a user’s location from
various location based services, and returns plausible nearby, but inaccurate, results.
Peer to peer systems such as Bittorrent, Freenet and others pose additional challenges
for privacy because a user’s client typically connects directly with a large number of
other individuals’ clients. This means the client’s location (IP address) is typically highly
visible within the network. However, in some cases, depending on particular details,
approaches like Tor (discussed next) can be used to disguise location. Work on disguising
an individual’s interests within this network – to promote plausible deniability of intent
– includes projects such as SwarmScreen [11] and OneSwarm [26]. Other approaches,
including encrypting all transferred queries and data have been taken by systems such as
Mega.8
Perhaps the most sophisticated current tool developed for obscuring network activity
and trafﬁc origin is Tor [14], which works at the network-level to hide the origin of
packets when communicating with a website or other third party. Tor works as a peer
to peer overlay network that routes Web and other network requests through a randomly
selected circuit of hosts on the network using the onion routing technique, which makes
it intractable to deduce the origin of a particular packet. In conjunction with end to end
encryption (such as over HTTPs), Tor has been shown to effectively thwart eavesdropping
and DPI methods.
Even with such tools, ISPs, mobile broadband providers and other last mile internet
access providers can collect a signiﬁcant quantity of low-level data pertaining to the
physical place and times that a person accesses sites, the quantity of data exchanged, and
the potential destinations. To thwart this level of tracking, several hardware vendors and
operating systems are starting to incorporate the ability to perform identiﬁer randomisation
(such as MAC-address and Bluetooth hardware address randomisation.9 Such features
4DisconnectMe – https://disconnect.me/
5AdBlock Plus – https://adblockplus.org/
6Privacy Badger – https://www.eff.org/privacybadger
7HTTPS Everywhere – https://www.eff.org/Https-everywhere
8Mega – www.mega.com
9Such features are expected to be introduced as a standard feature to the consumer market for the ﬁrst time
by Apple in iOS 8 – http://appleinsider.com/articles/14/06/09/mac-address-randomization-joins-apples-heap-
of-ios-8-privacy-improvements
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are standard for an emerging group of speciality security hardened devices, including
security-enhanced mobile phones and tablets (such as the Black Phone10).
While these tools are dedicated to obfuscating action and identity for actions in the
digital realm, automatic tracking of people and their activities in the physical world has
also increased, thanks to improvements in facial recognition, the introduction of digital
tokens and keys for granting people access to physical spaces, membership cards (loyalty
programmes), credit cards, and so forth. A number of projects and approaches have
similarly been introduced to reduce trackability in this space. In terms of protection against
facial recognition algorithms, for example, Harvey et al introduced a special make-up
technique based on reverse engineering the most popular face detection algorithms, called
CV Dazzle [22]. To reduce infrared camera based person tracking Harvey also introduced
heat signature cloaking burqas and hoodies in a line of clothing called Stealth Wear.11
To reduce city-wide tracking using transport cards such as the London Oyster card
and NYC MetroCard, as well as purchase tracking via loyalty card schemes, a common
practice that has arisen in several cities has been to host social meetups where people
regularly gather and swap their valueless cards. This allows them to confound data mining
algorithms by eliminating the assumption that a single card will be owned and used by a
single person by having it used instead by a constantly evolving group [31].
3. A Selection of Obfuscation Strategies
The aim of this chapter is to set out some strategies by which the user can add some
disinformation into digital social networks in order to regain some measure of privacy.
Since every situation is different, from the operation of the network to the desires of
the participants, it is necessary to develop several strategies, and understand under what
circumstances they may be appropriate and what tensions between utility and privacy
arise from their use.
As a starting point, Alexander’s taxonomy [3] discusses several types of disinforma-
tion which relate to modifying single messages along schema such as:
redaction, where some or all of the information in a message is hidden;
airbrushing, where some of the information is changed: this can take the form of local
crowd blending, where small alterations are carried out so the new message is
similar enough tobeplausible, orglobal crowd blendingwheremessages are heavily
altered in order that they resemble plausible, but quite different messages;
curveball, where extra, distracting information is added to messages which pushes them
into a low density area of message space.
However, due to the pervasiveness of modern communications, we are concerned with
modifying message streams, where a trace of multiple values must be considered. The
social aspect inherent to modern communication tools increases the range and frequency
of interaction with others, which in turn increases the chance of lies being exposed, while
at the same time opening up the possibility of colluding to strengthen the obfuscatory
practices.
10Black Phone – https://www.blackphone.ch
11Stealth Wear – ahprojects.com/projects/stealth-wear
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Figure 1. Models of interaction with semi-trusted services. a) Direct transmission of information; b) computa-
tionally mediated transmission, where some friendly computational machinery is enlisted to aid in obfuscatory
processes.
In this section, we present a range of obfuscation strategies, some of which are
speculative, but many of which are drawn from existing examples both inside and outside
the digital sphere.
For each strategy we discuss: i) what kind of alteration of baseline data is performed;
ii) what the motivation is for doing it; iii) what the possible use cases are; iv) how some
form of computational support aids in the deception; v) some of the systems (if any) which
do this currently.
It is problematic to consider the obfuscatory tactics here without a sense of the
scenario in which they are to be deployed. Our scenario in this chapter is as follows.
The user wishes to make use of services which expect location information. The lo-
cation information provided is shared publicly and is almost certainly stored indeﬁ-
nitely. At times, the user may want to draw on location based information – such as
restaurant recommendations or directions – and there may be times when they wish
to verify that they were at a particular location.
The service is hence semi-trusted: there are some beneﬁts which the user wishes to
accrue, but there are aspects of the service which make the user unwilling to entrust
their complete location history to it. We have chosen location as a clearly understandable
facet of personal data, and one which can be easily used to re-identify individuals from
anonymised datasets [13].
The standard model of interaction (Figure 1a) involves the user submitting their data
directly to the service; for our obfuscatory techniques, we would like to enlist computa-
tional support (Figure 1b). This is typiﬁed by, but not limited to, mediation from a personal
data store, which acts on behalf of the user to modify the data which they provide. In
Figures 2 and 3, we plot a ﬁctitious one-dimensional location measurement against time
in order to give a sense of how obfuscations unfold across time in multiple locations.12
We show the individual’s true location as a continuous line, along with the measurements
made by their device; we then overlay the points whichwould be submitted on their behalf
after obfuscation.
3.1. Strategies for the Lone Obfuscator
Figure 2 lists a collection of possible obfuscation strategies, with Figure 2a showing the
true location as a curve, and the dots representing reports of this position to the location-
aware service.
12While a two dimensional, map-based representation would be more immediate, it is then difﬁcult to clearly
show temporal aspects.
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Figure 2. Obfuscation strategies for the lone agent. Location has been reduced to a single dimension so it can
be plotted against time. Real data is shown in purple with circular points. Constructed or manipulated points
have different shapes. Schemes which require a simulation of human behaviour are marked with a head icon
( ), and where an alternative model of the world is created, it is shown as a dotted line.
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3.1.1. Chaff
World War II ﬁghter planes would emit clouds of radar reﬂective chaff, which created
multiple traces on the screens of radar operators, and hence disguised the true position of
their aircraft. In a similar manner, we can add in multiple location data points alongside
the real ones, making it difﬁcult to determine what the true values are. This is the one of
the few methods where the complete, accurate data stream is stored. Hence the user can
still access any beneﬁts which rely on accurate information. However, adding a multitude
of randomised points to a service which expects a single contiguous trace is both easily
detectable, and may break functionality – a run tracking application would be likely to
give unreliable distance estimations in the presence of chaff.
3.1.2. Noise Injection
The most computationally simple form of obfuscation is the addition of ‘noise’ to the
reports which are sent to the semi-trusted party. Here, the points which are submitted
deviate from the true values in a randommanner. This allows the user to conceal their exact
location, while giving a broad indication of where they are. Depending on the level of
noise, this can allow the use of location based serviceswithout revealingmuch about actual
behaviour. For example, it might reveal your location on the high street so you can arrange
to meet friends, but without revealing which shops you were visiting. This is compatible
with services which expect coherent location data, and may be indistinguishable from
the inaccuracies of the location sensors. One downside is that the “true” location traces
are not present in the record of the service. For example, TripAdvisor can still provide a
good enough list of recommended attractions around the given ‘noisy’ location, however
a navigation application will not be able to provide reliable directions.
3.1.3. Coarsened Granularity (or Quantisation)
Rather than adding noise to the data being sent, it can instead be quantised to a coarser
granularity, akin to blurring, or zoomingout on amap.Again, this is a techniquewhichmay
help to derive useful information from the service without revealing more than is neces-
sary: using a service to ﬁnd friends in the same city should only require city level informa-
tion to be shared. An example of this can be found in Android’s permission system, which
has separate controls for ACCESS_COARSE_LOCATION versus ACCESS_FINE_LOCATION.
3.1.4. Systematic Deviation
In some cases, it may be possible to introduce systematic deviations into the digital record.
In order to do this, the user needs to be able to deﬁne which points to alter, and what
to replace them with. One possibility would be thematic replacement – ‘hide the times
I went to the pub by saying I was at a cafe’. Another would be to disguise the user’s
home and work locations – places where they are less likely to require location based
searches, but which make it very easy to re-identify them from anonymised data. It is
likely that this will require some form of computational support to i) identify targets for
replacement as they occur and ii) ﬁnd suitable replacements. Using this technique, some,
but not all of the true data is stored; however, derived information – such as beverage
preferences in the example above – can be wildly and purposefully distorted. The nature
and fact of the distortions may be hard to uncover, as no simultaneous traces or strange
movement patterns are produced. Depending on the domain, subtle alterations may have
large effects.
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3.1.5. Pretend to be me
With increasing computational support, it becomes possible to create a model of the user
which outputs plausible ‘normal’ data. This can then be used to replace periods of abnor-
mal behaviour, or even replace normal behaviour with statistically similar but untrue data.
An early example is when neighbours (or automatic switches) are employed to turn lights
on and off in a home which has been vacated for the holiday, disguising the true anoma-
lous data of a dark, empty house with the appearance of normal occupation. Similarly,
one might avoid making Facebook posts which indicate an absence to avoid burglary.
This kind of deception can be difﬁcult to achieve. However computational systems are
emerging which can aid users, for example Beyer’s digital alibi system [5].
3.1.6. Coherent Deviation
As the converse of simulating normality, the user may wish to pretend to be somewhere
they are not. This is similar to creating systematic deviations, but on a grander scale; the
user would like to create a narrative for the deviation, and then have suitable data points
constructed. For example, the user might pretend to be on holiday, or at a conference,
and would like location traces which match that narrative to be created, such as going
to the convention centre in the day, and returning to a hotel at night. This requires a
computational model of user behaviour which can be applied to new locations – a non
trivial task. However, there is the potential to create obfuscated data which is difﬁcult
to distinguish from standard behaviour. Services like Please Don’t Stalk Me13 enable
geotagging tweets with fake location information, and the Chrome browser supports
faking location information in the browser, through theChromeDeveloper Tools emulator.
These tools can be used for some of the previous strategies, for noise injection by using
random locations, or for systematic deviation, when only the location of certain tweets is
modiﬁed.
3.1.7. Palimpsestiﬁcation14
Taking the idea of coherent deviations a stage further, and combiningwith the idea of chaff,
the user could createmultiple overlapping traces; each tracewould be locally coherent and
plausible, but someone inspecting the data would have no way of knowing which was the
real one. This is similar to the strategy of CacheCloak [35], which continuously generates
sheaves of probable future behaviour and searches location based services relevant to each
path. The computational support required is similar to the coherent deviation example
– to be able to run a model of the user’s behaviour in novel locations – although more
coordination might be required between the stories. The trade-off is that while the true
location data can be entered along with the generated points, the deception is obvious,
and location based services may become upset at the multiple paths.
13http://pleasedontstalkme.com/
14
‘Palimpsest’ originallyer referred to a document where orignal markings have been abraded so that it may
be re-used, but still contains some traces of the original, so the texts are superimposed. Modern usage covers a
range of other situations when multiple activity traces are overlaid.
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Figure 3. Three possible multi-person obfuscaction strategies. As before, modelled behaviour is shown as
dotted lines. In the Artiﬁcial co-location strategy, circles represent real datapoints, diamonds are the ones that
the obfuscating user submits. In the Account sharing strategy, the shape of points represents the account through
which they are submitted.
3.2. Collaborative Obfuscation
Including others in the obfuscation challenge opens up a range of new strategies, where
collusion can aid in the creation of otherwise unachievable data streams or increase the
veracity of artiﬁcially created data. Generally the possibilities in computational systems
are analogous to pre-computational possibilities; computational support tends to be in
the form of coordination to ﬁnd collaborators or and check coherence of data points.
The ideas outlined here are more speculative, as few computational systems of this type
exist. There are aspects which make these strategies harder to pull off as coherence is
required across multiple different accounts; however the counterpoint is that if successful,
the obfuscation is better supported and harder to detect.
3.2.1. Artiﬁcial Co-location
One way to obtain a realistic but untrue location trace is to re-present the trace of a
collaborator. This can look like relatively natural behaviour; two people meeting up to
carry out joint activities or socialisation. Computational support here can involve ﬁnding
accomplices to ‘co-locate’ with – people who are willing to share their location, and
are behaving in ways which match the desired story – as well as the technical details of
transferring location devices between accounts.
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3.2.2. Supporting Evidence
Co-located people often share the fact of their co-location, explicitly or implicitly, whether
in group photos – ‘Here’s me and X on top of the Scott monument’, broadcast messages –
‘Just been hanging out with X at the coffee shop’, or shared plans – ‘Going to the cinema
with X tonight – anyone want to join in?’. Enlisting collaborators to make these kinds of
posts can help to add depth to a constructed trace, weaving it more tightly into the social
fabric.
3.2.3. Account Sharing
In a similar manner to the swapping of loyalty cards discussed in [10], users of services
can share accounts. This results in an account or set of accounts withmore or less plausible
activity, yet allows the users to remain unidentiﬁed. Much as the loyalty card swapper
confounded efforts to inspect individual buying habits, or the ‘Anonymous’ movement
aggregates the activities of a multitude of participants behind a stylised mask, services
such as DuckDuckGo aggregate many people’s search results, ensuring that the search
providers cannot build up any identiﬁable user histories.
Computational intelligence can be enlisted to support many different ways of assign-
ing people to accounts, such as the following.
Many to one schemes have a single account controlled by multiple people. This can re-
sult in a completely incoherent manner; DuckDuckGo’s aggregated search makes
no attempt to imitate individual behaviour. Alternatively, sharing can be tied into a
coherent shared identity, where multiple people contribute to a single shared per-
sona [12]. Here there is a challenge to maintain consistency: when multiple people
control a call centre’s chat avatar, they must ensure that the relevant information
and state is shared [ibid.]. When multiple users control a single game character,
the game world enforces consistency, and the community must produce coherent
action streams in order to progress.
Randomised schemes allocate accounts to people without a discernible order. When
loyalty cards are mailed between anonymous participants, there is an explicit desire
to produce implausible data in order to confound analysis. Online accounts can
be similarly shared, leading to traces which are unlikely to have been produced
by a single individual. In our locative service example, this allows users to access
beneﬁts which do not rely on individual history while preserving some level of
privacy. Computational support involves ﬁnding accounts to share, and ensuring
that each account is only accessed by a single person at any given time.
Structured schemes allow for accounts to be used as appropriate according to some
criterion. If a location service offers history based beneﬁts (e.g. loyalty rewards or
reputation) then it could be beneﬁcial to borrow a local user’s account when going
on holiday – couchsurﬁng but with login credentials instead of ﬂats. Infrastructure
would be required to discover appropriate accounts, and mediate access.
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4. Operationalisation – Managing Deception and Its Side Effects
4.1. Going Beyond Location
In Section 3, we discussed obfuscatory possibilities with respect to a location based
service; however, this is a single application area, and the need for regaining informational
autonomy is felt across a spectrum of data types and services, hence we must discuss how
these techniques generalise.
Location data is generally collected by a device which the user owns. In many cases,
this is a smartphone, which uses a combination of GPS, cell tower triangulation and WiFi
access point locations to determine a user’s position in space. The user then has some
level of choice about who to share the data with and how. This is not always the case,
however: cell tower records can identify user’s locations – and individuals can be picked
out from very sparse histories [13]. There was a recent outcry15 when it was discovered
that smartphonemanufacturers were collecting location data from their users without their
knowledge, despite the possible mitigations of good intentions or technical reasons.16
Obfuscating data (location or otherwise) can be done only if the user is aware that
the data is being collected in the ﬁrst place. Some knowledge about the data collection
process, such as what data is captured and when, can then help improve the obfuscation.
Somedata, evenwhen known to be collected, cannot be obfuscated. Examples include
all ofﬁcial or administrative data: census data, police reports, tax returns, health records,
but also dealings with private organisations with a regulated status like banks and utility
providers. Obfuscating these types of data in any way is often a criminal offence. For
example ‘obfuscating’ one’s source of income by adding chaff or noise may be construed
as tax evasion, theft, money laundering, etc.
For data that can be obfuscated without legal consequences, and for which we are
aware of the data collection,wehave the opportunity to use someof the strategies described
in Section 3, although they must be adapted to ﬁt the data and the situation at hand.
For a photo sharing application or microblogging tool, adding chaff could mean
posting more content – but fabricated. It can be realised by posting public domain photos
on Instagram from a randomly chosen topic, or ﬂooding Twitter with randomly generated
text, older posts, or fragments from existing texts like web pages or books. For browsing
history in an online shop, we can use bots or browser extensions, or tools like Selenium17
to simulate browsing of various items by randomly requesting pages beside the page we
are interested in. While it does not hide the fact that a person visited the shop, it can
obfuscate their interest. This can be useful when dealing with Amazon, or another large
scale marketplace, but it can be less useful when the online shop is catering for a small
niche market. More subtly, chaff can be added to the tags attached to photos or posts, to
make categorisation more difﬁcult. The goal of chaff is not to be believable on deeper
inspection, or even consistent, so the algorithms for choosing what to post and where to
browse need not be too complex.
Prepaid, disposable mobile phones (‘burners’) are used in order to avoid surveillance,
as they break the link between a person’s identity and their cellphone number. Similarly,
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address from being used as a global identiﬁer for the person. For websites which require
registration, disposable email provider services18 mean that a different email address can
beused for each site,while still receiving the email conﬁrmations in a ‘real’mailbox.These
email addresses can still be linked back to the true user if the service is compromised in
some way; for truly disconnected disposable email addresses, services like GuerillaMail,
10 minute mail, etc. provide temporary email addresses with a short life span.
Applying noise injection or coarsened granularity strategies can limit the beneﬁt
of some services, and in some cases defeat the purpose of using them altogether – like
injecting noise in the images posted on Instagram.
These strategies can, however, be used successfully with optional data that is required
by some services but which do not impact on the service provided. Randomly changing
your date of birth or hometown, or even your name on Facebook or Twitter, will still
allow you to use the service to connect with friends or post updates respectively. Changing
(injecting noise into) the date of birth can be used as the real date of birth approaches,
to avoid the congratulatory messages, and reverted back to once the date has passed. A
different type of changing granularity is withholding the year from the date of birth, thus
allowing the actual date be know, without revealing the age. Any functionality of a service
that is regarded of low importance can be used as a place where noise can be injected,
or where the granularity can be coarsened. This of course leaves part of the information
unobfuscated.
Changing the declared date of birth can also be systematic, a user can choose an
untrue date which to reuse in all services that require it. Using the same completely fabri-
cated persona in all online communication is supported by services like Fake Name Gen-
erator19 which will not only create geographically localised names, but also provide valid
additional information like address, credit card, email address, phone number, mother
maiden’s name, username and password, employment information, weight and height and
blood type, and even a favourite colour. Using the persona systematically and consistently
enables a complete separation between the real person and their presence online.
Several personae can be created and used to simulate collaborative obfuscation strate-
gies, where the fake characters mimic the existence of supporting evidence for the lie. As-
troturﬁng uses multiple accounts to simulate widespread support for a topic, organisation
or political message, creating the illusion of a grassroots movement. It can, however, be
used for the obfuscation of individuals’ data, by corroborating claims, and adding depth
to the constructed scenarios created.
4.2. Personal Data Stores – Allies on the Intimacy Battleground
Personal data stores (PDS) represent a vital component in the issue of online presentation:
having trusted, user controlled repositories for data enables a more user-centric approach
to management of capta, ﬁlling in the ‘Mediator’ component of Figure 1. Bridges can
then be built between personal data stores and the rest of the world in order to support
the connected, networked interactions which users now expect. If these bridges simply
share the data, even in a controlled manner, nothing has been gained; hence the bridges
become conduits for manipulating truth and constructing falsehoods. As personal data
18A comparison between some disposable email providers is available on LifeHacker http://lifehacker.com/
5306452/how-do-you-keep-your-email-address-private
19http://www.fakenamegenerator.com/
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Figure 4. Example veriﬁcation scenario. The user (Ally) provides a set of real data, plus chaff to a location
aware service. A third party (Brett) then requests veriﬁcation of some of the points, which Ally provides. Brett
then wishes to share the data with Charlie, which requires Brett to verify to Charlie that the data are correct.
stores accumulate more real-time contextual data about the individual, as well as about
the individual’s social connections, PDSs can provide support for the often stressful and
mentally burdensome task of lie maintenance, for example: i) identifying when a person’s
real activities or whereabouts contradict a lie, and might be discovered; ii) identifying
indirect social channels that could expose a lie (e.g. through friends of friends); iii)
suggesting appropriate lies to use which are least likely to be detected; iv) suggesting
individuals to lie to to support lie maintenance (e.g. friends of the person being lied to).
4.3. Veriﬁcation and Provenance Mechanisms
In Section 1.5 we suggested that veriﬁcation is a more nuanced mechanism than control
over sharing. One of the effects of the obfuscation strategies discussed previously is that
it becomes impossible to know which parts of the user’s data-stream are grounded in
reality, and represent ‘true’ values. This means that if someone wishes to engage with the
data and have an expectation of accuracy, they need to ascertain which parts of the record
are correct. This shifts the locus of control from the process of sharing to the process of
veriﬁcation – the user canmake claims about subsets of the data points currently attributed
to them.
Let us consider a scenario where Ally has some personal data, which Brett would
like to make use of. Brett also wants to sell Ally’s data to Charlie.
There are a range of statements which Ally can make, including: ‘this subset of
data points is mine’, ‘these points are within 50m of my true location’, ‘these points are
representative of my general behaviour’ and so on. The choice of which point to claim
can be negotiated in the context of the question being asked, and Ally can determine what
is and is not acceptable.
If the external agency wishes to disseminate the users data, it becomes an issue of
propagating the trust which the user has given them– essentially, Brettmust say toCharlie:
‘Ally has veriﬁed these points to me, and now I am verifying them to you’. The manner
in which the initial veriﬁcation was carried out now becomes critical:
• if an email or similar communication is used, Ally simply declares ‘these points
are mine’, then the secondary veriﬁcation is only as strong as trust in the commu-
nication chain – Brett must convince Charlie that the email or message is genuine
and emails are easy to fake.
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• Ally could use a technique which would give Brett no future tangible proof of
the veriﬁcation – for example, a single use URL which lists IDs for the correct
points; Brett would have no evidence with which to convince Charlie that Ally had
veriﬁed the points, other than reputation alone.
• Ally can cryptographically sign the claimusing public key cryptography. The claim
is then essentially public knowledge, and anyone can check Ally’s veriﬁcation.
• Ally can sign the claim after Brett has; this means that Brett cannot hide the fact
that they were the recipient of the claim, so it is impossible to propagate the claim
anonymously.
All of these techniques relate to making the public record so unreliable that anyone
who wants to use any of the data will need to separately establish a chain of provenance
for certain parts of it. A related goal would be to make it illegal, or at least unacceptable, to
use personal data without having a valid provenance chain for it. Essentially, in order to
use anyone’s data, Charlie would have to explain how they came to have it, and be able
to prove that Ally had shared the data originally.
4.3.1. Notarisation
The veriﬁcation examples above rely on Brett trusting Ally about which data points are
correct. There may be times – e.g. when creating alibis – when Ally needs to have a
stronger form of proof.
In this case, third party digital notarisation services can be employed.20 These services
take in some document or datum, and provide a certiﬁcate which can be used to verify that
that piece of data was provided at a certain time. For example, if someone wants to make a
prediction for the outcome of a football match, they could notarise that before the match,
and then subsequently prove that they had made the prediction beforehand. It is generally
not possible to prove that they only made a single prediction, so this technique is most
suitable when the range of possible things to notarise is so large as to make notarising the
entire space infeasible.
With regard to personal data, we can notarise our true data stream as we produce it.
This means that we can prove that we had considered those points at the time, and if we
say we were in a particular place, there is a high chance we were, however, it does not
work in the complementary situation as producing a notarised point does not prove that
we were not anywhere else.
Notarisation does not necessitate revealing the data itself. For instance, when sub-
mitting a location, a representation of the time and place could be hashed, and this hash
notarised (Figure 5a). Additionally, points can be notarised in sequence, so that we can
demonstrate contiguous sub-sequences of points as having been provided previously; by
hashing the current location with the previous location, we can link the points together,
to build up conﬁdence in the notarised results (Figure 5b).
4.4. Effects and Ethics of Obfuscation
Brunton and Nissenbaum discuss the ethics of obfuscation at length in [10], and address
issues like wastefulness, dishonesty, free-riding, pollution, and possible system damage.
One answer is ‘that obfuscation has no ethical or political valence of its own, only to the
20e.g. http://virtual-notary.org/, a free service hosted at Cornell University.
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Figure 5. Notarisation of personal data. a) Data points and times are hashed, and the values sent to a notary
service, which provides a URL to verify that i) the given data was supplied and ii) when it was supplied. Hashes
are used so that the data is not publicly shared. b) If the hash of the previous submission is included, then
sequences of consecutive points can be veriﬁed.
ends that it serves’ [ibid.]. However, with the sharing of personal data, there are multiple
overlapping contexts in which the obfuscation takes place, which should be dissected.
On a personal level, obfuscation changes the picture of us that a service has. For
different services, different levels and types of distortion may be bearable or desirable:
while adding noise to a location signal may still allow sensible location based recommen-
dations, pretending to like random products might make a recommender service unusable.
One of the reasons so many obfuscation strategies were presented is that each strategy
preserves different qualities, and the choice of what and how to obfuscate must be made in
context, as there is an unavoidable tradeoff between privacy preservation and maintaining
the level of personalisation that makes a service worthwhile.
On a social level, being caught in a lie can be unpleasant; as Bok says:
In practice, however, lying to enemies has enormous drawbacks... lies to enemies
carry very special dangers of backﬁring. All too often, the lie directed at adversaries
is a lie to friends as well; and when it is discovered, as some always are, the costs are
high [6, p. 141].
While the reputational damage from lying can be signiﬁcant, some steps can be taken to
mitigate this. Obfuscation techniques can be chosen which are clearly non-true to human
observers, or to one’s trusted circle of friends, echoing boyd’s social steganography [9].
The alterations will then have the desired effect of confounding automated surveillance,
without giving one’s friends the sense of being deceived.
Additionally, systematic data manipulation can result in presenting an online persona
which diverges from one’s own. Recently, Mat Honan tried the experiment of ‘liking’
everything on Facebook [23]. After two days of adding this chaff to his activities, his
public persona demonstrated radical far-right and far-left viewpoints, to the extent that
his friends became concerned.
As well as presenting an untrue picture of oneself, systematically adding noise may
also have unplanned side effects that might directly impact one’s friends and connections.
For example, Mat’s friends suddenly found themselves deluged by the stream of liked
articles he was generating, to the point where his junk data stream overwhelmed others’
friends’ legitimate statuses and impeded their ability to use the social network normally.
On a societal level, while obfuscation overlaps both ‘pro-social’ lying and ‘butler
lies’, it must also be recognised that systematic untruths can weaken the social fabric,
disrupting trust with friends and coleagues, as well as those carrying out surveillance. This
adds friction to online interaction, as one must put the effort into constantly questioning
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what data is true and false. On a broader scale, the social good which comes of having
access to increasingly detailed personal data can be compromised if signiﬁcant proportions
of the data are untrue.
In terms of accountability, there is the danger of being unable to verify your real
behaviour. While the possibility of notarisation (Section 4.3.1) can create support, any
defence which relies on a stream of information which has been systematically manipu-
lated is likely to be problematic. As online systems are increasingly being used to account
for who you are and what you do, making your online persona questionable could have
far reaching consequences. A complementary risk is that the constructed data might be
accidentally incriminating: a spuriously generated location point might place a user at a
crime scene, or a participant in an account sharing program could use a borrowed account
while engaging in criminal activity. There is also a danger that the same tools that pre-
serve personal privacy are applicable to covering up illegal or anti-social behaviour (e.g.
cyber-bullying).
Finally, at a systems level, the context is dynamic, and services will respond to
obfuscatory practices. Services may shut down or transition to a payment based model in
response to the declining value of increasingly noisy data. Future services will be better
at spotting obfuscated data, and may take steps to prevent it, analysing the coherence and
plausibility of incoming data. Obfuscation systems will have to evolve along with the
context in which they are used, creating an arms race between obfuscators and service
providers.
These issues suggest ﬁrstly that obfuscation is a form of free riding [10]: if everyone
did it the system would grind to a halt, but if a few people do it, they can take advantage
of everyone else’s truthfulness to preserve their own privacy. However, if the majority of
the population engaged in obfuscation, this would be a clear signal that the balance of
privacy was unacceptable to the general population, becoming a voice of protest.
Secondly, it is clear that more understanding is needed around what kinds of obfus-
cation to apply when, and how to create tools to enable these practices in the context of
connected, visible, online social behaviour.
However, there is a view that anonymity is natural and healthy both on and off-line,
and that methods that force full identiﬁability at each interaction are both difﬁcult, fragile
and unhealthy for long term growth. Proponents of this view (e.g. [9,30,45,46]) argue that
obfuscation approaches are not just ethical, but necessary for individuals to maintain the
autonomy and freedom from being entrapped into a single identity tied to their presence
in the physical world. In particular, it has been argued (e.g. [46]) that the freedom to
have multiple, ﬂexible identities, including borrowed identities [12], group identities, and
role-based identities, fosters the kinds of identity experimentation that leads people to
learn how to cultivate healthy social relationships throughout their lives. This principle,
known as the ‘elastic self’, has been responsible for key growth in online communities to
date, and is what is being threatened by the surveillance and real-name policies mentioned
previously.
The approaches outlined here, in concert with other tools to aid privacy, anonymity
and ambiguity in communications, help to redress the current power imbalance and reduce
the effects of caustic surveillance. By adding some elasticity to the system, uses regain
some autonomy in the way they are seen and sorted online, and develop power over the
constitution of their online identity.
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5. Conclusion
In this chapter, we have presented a particular approach to shifting the boundary between
privacy and use of data. We have taken a purposefully adversarial approach to the protec-
tion of personal data as an indication of potential steps which can be taken by individuals
at a grass-roots level. These techniques are not the ﬁnal word in personal data sharing,
but sketch out a particular position in the journey towards a balanced societal attitude to-
wards surveillance. In time we hope that stronger legal and social protections of personal
data will be introduced, so that society can enjoy the beneﬁts of data sharing while being
respectful of the individual’s right to privacy [38,40].
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